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Abstract: We explore the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth in 
developing countries, distinguishing between mergers and acquisitions (“M&As”) and 
“Greenfield” investment. We find that these two types of FDI differ substantially with respect 
to their influence on growth. While Greenfield FDI substantially enhances growth, M&As 
h av e n o ef f ect, a t b est. W e al so dem onstra te  th at, i n con trast to G reenf i el d F DI, a l arger 
volume of M&As results in an appreciated real exchange rate. The resulting loss in price 
competitiveness may explain the poor growth effect of the M&A variant of FDI. 
 
Keywords: Growth, foreign direct investment, mergers and acquisitions, green-field 
investment. 




Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often viewed as a particularly desirable form of capital. 
However, the evidence of a positive effect of FDI on growth is mixed. Doucouliagos et 
al. (2010) report that out of the 880 regressions reported in the 108 empirical studies using 
cross-country data published before 2009, only 43% report a significantly positive coefficient, 
while 17% are significantly negative and 40% insignificant. 
However, FDI is heterogeneous. It is theoretically defined by the fact that it represents 
a capital flow that is motivated by industrial, as opposed to financial, considerations, but this 
definition is hardly operational empirically. Official statistics therefore consider a capital flow 
to be FDI if it exceeds ten percent of the investor’s affiliate abroad. Both definitions pool 
together two very different forms of foreign investment: greenfield investment, whereby 
foreign investors build a new productive unit from scratch, and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As), whereby the foreign investor acquires existing assets. Those two forms of foreign 
investment fundamentally differ. There is little doubt that greenfield investment increases the 
host country’s physical capital stock. Whether M&As do is an open question. Essentially they 
consist in the sale of existing domestic assets to a foreign acquirer. What the seller does with 
the proceeds of that sale is left to his/her discretion. 
Since M&As and greenfield investment are usually pooled together under the heading 
FDI, the empirical literature’s implicit assumption is that the seller use those proceeds to 
invest in the domestic economy. There are however alternatives. In the extreme, the seller can 
spend his/her revenue on imported consumption goods, with no positive effect on the host 
country’s economy. The impact of green-field investment and M&As on the host country 
should therefore differ. 
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the difference between the impact of 
green-field investment versus M&As on growth. To do so, the rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. The next section discusses the reasons why the impact of total FDI on growth may 
be either positive or negative, and the extent to which greenfield investment and M&s differ. 
Section 3 provides a break-down of total FDI in greenfield investment and M&As, and 
presents the resulting data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy followed to investigate 3 
 
the relationship between total FDI, greenfield investment, and M&As. Section 5 displays our 
main findings. Section 6 discusses the mechanism that may drive them. The last section 
concludes. 
2. The relation between FDI, its components and growth 
From a theoretical standpoint, FDI can have both positive and adverse effects on the host’s 
country growth. In this section, we first survey those effects, then discuss whether they are 
more likely to appear following M&As or greenfield investment. 
2.1. The positive effects of FDI on growth 
As FDI is first and foremost a capital inflow, its most obvious effect on growth runs through 
capital accumulation. In a world with decreasing marginal returns to investment, the return to 
investing in a country should be lower the lower its capital stock. Accordingly, capital should 
flow from capital-abundant countries to capital-poor countries, eventually equalizing the 
return to capital across countries. This is what Prasad et al.  (2007) refer to as the textbook 
theory of foreign capital and growth. According to that theory, FDI should add up to the host 
country’s capital stock. That effect may be transitory, according to the standard neoclassical 
growth model, or definitive, according to endogenous growth theories. In any case, FDI 
inflows should be associated to a rise in output and at least a transient growth acceleration. 
However, FDI is a particular form of capital inflow, which may not only affect the 
capital stock but also productivity, either directly or through spillover effects. The contention 
that FDI affects the productivity of foreign firms’ subsidiaries in the host country goes back to 
has been integrated in growth theory at least since Findlay  (1978). It has moreover been 
central to the theory of multinational firms since its early contributions, such as Caves (1974). 
Hymer  (1976) even relates the existence of multinational firms to their ownership of 
technological assets. The contention has received overwhelming empirical support, which 
Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) summarize by writing that the direct effect of foreign 
firms on the productivity of their subsidiaries is the most important contribution. 
The direct of FDI on the productivity of foreign affiliates may be complemented by 
spillovers effects. One may indeed expect the knowledge imported by foreign firms to spill 4 
 
over to the other firms of the industries where they operate. Early findings, like those reported 
by Blomström and Wolff (1994) suggested the existence of such horizontal spillover effects. 
However, in an influential paper, Aitken and Harrison (1999) showed that the literature’s 
optimistic findings were due to a misspecification of the estimated relation between foreign 
investment and productivity, and that the relation was, at best insignificant. Recently, 
however, Keller and Yeaple (2009) could report evidence of horizontal spillovers in high-
technology sectors. 
Finally, foreign direct investments may also affect productivity in other firms located 
in their supply chain, thereby producing vertical spillovers. Foreign firms’ subsidiaries may 
indeed have an incentive to improve the productivity of their suppliers. In line with this 
intuition, Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) reported evidence of positive spillovers from foreign 
firms operating in Lithuania on the upstream part of their supply chain. 
2.2. The adverse effects of FDI on growth 
Both factor accumulation and spillover effects should result in FDI inflows being associated 
with faster growth of their host country. However, the list of possible adverse effects of FDI 
suggested in the literature is longer than the list of positive effects. For clarity’s sake, they can 
be lumped in three broad categories: government-induced distortions, market distortions, and 
macroeconomic effects. 
The first government-induced distortion that may result in FDI reducing growth is the 
application of preferential tax treatment. Easterly (1993) constructs an endogenous growth 
model with two types of capital, and shows that subsidies to one sort of capital financed by a 
tax on the other may distort incentives in a way that reduces growth. As most countries try to 
attract FDI through tax exemptions and tax heavens, Easterly’s (1993) argument suggests a 
negative impact of FDI on growth. 
Trade barriers are a similar government-induced distortion that may limit the positive 
effects of FDI. Borenzstein et al. (1998) remark that circumventing trade restrictions is a 
common motivation of FDI. In that case, cross-border capital flows may be little related to 
differences in productivity, and thus have no effect or a negative effect of growth in the host 
country. Sadik and Bolbol  (2001) report evidence for Arab countries that supports 5 
 
Borenzstein et al.’s (1998) contention. They argue that those countries’ markets are protected, 
and report negative correlations between FDI and growth. 
The second series of distortions that may make the impact of FDI on growth negative 
are failures on the good market. Rodríguez-Clare (1996) builds a static model where the 
impact of multinational firms producing a final good can impose a negative externality on the 
host country’s economy The rationale is that in the presence of a love for variety of 
intermediate inputs in the final good sector, foreign firms may reduce the number of available 
intermediate goods in the economy if their employment linkages with upstream domestic 
firms are smaller than those of their domestic competitors. To explain the lack of evidence of 
horizontal spillovers in their sample of Venezuealan firms, Aitken and Harrison  (1999) 
moreover suggest that foreign entrants may steal the business of domestic firms, in particular 
smaller firms. 
The third, and possibly largest, series of distortions are probably to be found in the 
credit market. Early contributions suggested that market failures on that market could result in 
a misallocation of capital that may render foreign investment innocuous or even harmful. 
Such a possibility appears in a model of investment with adverse selection and costly state 
verification built by Boyd and Smith (1992). Razin et al. (1999) complement that intuition by 
building a model where they assume that foreign firms investing in a country acquire an 
informational advantage over domestic savers on the quality of firms. They can then keep the 
high-productivity firms and sell the others to domestic savers. In that context, foreign 
investors may have an incentive to overinvest in the host country, again resulting in a 
misallocation of capital. 
When one considers that FDI can be financed locally, an additional growth-reducing 
effect appears on the credit market, because foreign firms may crowd-out domestic firms. The 
suspicion of a crowding-out effect of domestic appeared in two studies of Ivory Coast where 
Harrison and McMillan (2003) observe that the share of foreign long-term borrowing at the 
sector level exacerbates domestic firms’ credit constraints.
1 Alfaro et al. (2009) provide a 
                                                 
1 Harrison et al. (2004) find opposite result in a panel of countries, which suggests that the impact of FDI on the 
access to credit of domestic depends on the extent of market imperfections in a country. 6 
 
theoretical backing to the possibility of a crowding-out effect of domestic firms by FDI in 
financially underdeveloped countries. 
Finally, FDI may also slow down growth because it results in real overvaluation of the 
currency of the host country. The point is made by Prasad et al. (2007) to explain the finding 
that capital exporting countries do not grow any slower than capital importing countries. In 
line with their hypothesis, they find that capital inflows are associated with real overvaluation 
of the domestic currency in a sample of non-industrialized countries. FDI inflows thereby 
impair the exports of manufactured goods, and result in a Dutch-syndrome. 
FDI inflows may then have either positive or adverse effects on growth. Whether the 
net balance is negative or positive is therefore essentially an empirical matter. However, the 
net balance may also on the entry mode of foreign investors. The next subsection discusses 
that issue. 
2.3. The balance of positive and adverse effects of M&As and greenfield investment 
To discuss the distinct effect of M&As and greenfield investment on growth, one may follow 
the same outline as in the previous subsection, and consider capital accumulation, before 
government-induced distortions before, and productivity growth. 
Firstly, all capital inflows may not result in capital accumulation. Admittedly, 
greenfield investment necessarily result in new assets being created, but use of the proceeds of 
M&As may be quite different. In particular, the proceeds of M&As may be simply consumed, 
without resulting in any additional productive capacity. The point is made by 
Mencinger (2003), who studies eight EU-candidates countries over the period 1994-2001. 
During that period, acquisitions were the chief form of FDI in those countries. In line with the 
hypothesis that politically-motivated sales of public assets resulted in current consumption 
and imports, Mencinger (1993) finds that FDI inflows did not affect overall investment, but 
were significantly related to a larger current account deficit and debt accumulation. 
Accordingly, one should expect a less systematic impact on growth of M&As than of 
greenfield investment. 
Secondly, the role of the government in determining the volume and quality of FDI 
can be crucial during privatizations programs. The privatization of public enterprises results in 7 
 
FDI if the acquirers of those enterprises are foreign firms. Loungani and Razin (2001) and 
Krugman (1998) then remark that there is no guarantee that the assets that the State sells to 
foreign investors will be run better. They could even be run less efficiently if the transfer of 
ownership is fraught with adverse selection. As Krugman (1998) points out, that will be the 
case if the foreign corporations that seize control of domestic enterprises do not have special 
competence, but simply have cash while the locals do not. Fire sales of public assets may thus 
result in a waste of resources. By construction, this argument only applies to existing assets. It 
therefore points to a potentially detrimental effect of M&As, but does not bear on greenfield 
investment. 
Thirdly, the two modes of entry may result in different transfers of technology. To our 
knowledge, no direct evidence or theory is available, but one may draw inferences from 
related theoretical reflections and empirical findings. Marin and Sasidharan  (2010) for 
instance distinguish foreign subsidiaries operating in India according to their research 
activities. They distinguish “competence creating” subsidiaries, which carry out technological 
efforts, and “competence exploiting” subsidiaries, and find that only the former generate 
positive spillover effects. Their distinction is reminiscent of Dunning and Narula  (1995) 
between “asset-exploiting” and “asset-augmenting” subsidiaries. As a result, M&As are 
unlikely to result in positive spillovers if they are not complemented by greenfield investment. 
Marin and Bell (2006) report similar results on a sample of Argentinean firms, showing that 
spillovers are larger when local subsidiaries undertake technological activities. These 
contributions all suggest that an acquisition must be followed by investments in the new 
subsidiary to lead to positive spillovers. 
To our knowledge, there is only one reference that systematically distinguishes pure 
greenfield investment from M&As, namely Calderón et al. (2004). Their study, however, uses 
a vector autoregression to explore the interaction between the two types of FDI, and does not 
consider their long-run growth effects. We are aware of no other contribution that studies the 
impact of the different components of FDI separately. 
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3. Greenfield FDI vs. Mergers and Acquisitions: A First Look at the Data 
 
D a t a  o n  t o t a l  F D I  i n f l o w s  a n d  o n  s a l e s  o f  a s s e t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  M e r g e r s & A c q u i s i t i o n s 
( “ M & A  S a l e s ” )  a r e  p r o v i d e d  b y  U N C T A D  f o r  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s .  W e  f o l l o w 
Calderon et al. (2004) in defining “Greenfield FDI” inflows as the difference between total 
FDI inflows and M&A sales. While the resulting negative numbers for some countries and 
time periods should not worry too much  - FDI inflows may become easily negative if the 
parent company repatriates profits without providing new capital – there might be an issue 
with the timing of transactions: as UNCTAD (2007:92) emphasizes, “... M&A statistics are 
those at the time of the closure of the deals, and not at the time of announcement. The M&A 
values are not necessarily paid out in a single year.” We believe that this constellation, which 
might result in overrating M&A values (relative to the total volume of FDI reported by the 
balance of payments) for individual years, does not weigh too heavily if we look at longer-run 
averages. Using five-year averages, this is, in fact, what we do. 
 
*** Insert Figure 1 around here *** 
 
A look at Figure 1 suggests that the share of Greenfield FDI as a share of total FDI in 
developing countries decreased substantially around the turn of the millennium – due, 
probably to a wave of M&As in the context of large-scale privatizations. More recently, this 
share has picked up again. The stark decline of M&As in the years 2002 and 2003 suggest 
that business-cycle conditions in the US and Europe may be important. Total FDI, by 
contrast, has proven to be quite resilient during this period. Figure 2 shows the evolution of 
Greenfield FDI and M&As (in 1000s of US dollars) for four different countries: Argentina, 
Bulgaria, China and Senegal. For Argentina and Bulgaria, the bulk of FDI inflows came in the 
form of M&As at times, while China and Senegal predominantly attracted Greenfield FDI. 
 
*** Insert Figure 2 around here *** 
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4. A Disaggregated View on the Growth Effects of FDI 
 
4.1. The Regression Equation 














it t i t i it x FDI FDI y y y
1
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1 , 1 , ln ln ln H [ M G J E D   (1) 
 
where the left-hand side is the growth rate of real per-capita GDP over a five-year period,  
1 , ln  t i y  is the (log of) initial per-capita GDP at the start of that period, 
A M
it FDI
&  and 
Greenfield
it FDI  a r e  t h e  t w o  t y p e s  o f  F D I  i n f l o w s  –  m e r g e r s  a n d  a c q u i s i t i o n s  s a l e s  a n d 
“Greenfield FDI” – whose effect we want to analyze. The set of control variables 
k
it x  that is 
used to avoid omitted variable bias will be described below. The time dummies  t [  are meant 
to capture period-specific effects – such as global growth surges and recessions – that might 
blur the separate effect of FDI. Since the disturbance  it H  possibly doesn’t have a constant 
variance and since it is possibly correlated across time periods, our inference will be based on 
a cluster-robust covariance. Later on, we will also add fixed effects to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Moreover, we will confront the potential endogeneity of FDI with respect to 
growth by estimating (1) by two-stage least squares (TSLS). 
Using five-year averages in growth regressions has first been suggested by 
Islam (1995) as well as Caselli et al. (1996). While the question whether an quinquennial 
structure is appropriate for discovering long-run growth effects might be debated, using a 
panel data set instead of the purely cross-sectional structure as in Barro (1993) offers the huge 
advantage of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 10 
 
4.1. Data 
Our data set comprises some 80 low-income and middle-income countries.
2 Since we are 
predominantly interested in the growth effects of “M&A-type FDI” and “Greenfield-type 
FDI” – with the latter defined as the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales – 
our sample is constrained by the availability of these data. As reported in Section 3, data on 
M & A  s al e s  as  w el l  as  d a ta  on  t o ta l  F D I i n f l ows  a r e  p r ov i de d i n  th e  U N C TA D ’ s W or l d 
Investment Report (UNCTAD 2009), and are available on an annual basis since 1987. To 
estimate the parameters of equation (1), we are using the intervals 1987-90, 1991-95, 1996-
2000, 2001-05. 
As for the normalization of FDI flows, we are following the standard approach to 
divide M&A/Greenfield FDI (in current US dollars) in a given year by GDP (in current US 
dollars) in the same year.
3 The variables 
A M
it FDI
&  and 
Greenfield
it FDI are five-year averages of 
these ratios. To demonstrate that our results do not hinge on that particular choice, we will 
also explore the effect of FDI relative to the recipient country’s population. 
Below we will report the results of using a small set of control variables and a large 
set of control variables.
4 The small set of control variables consists of growth determinants 
suggested by the human-capital augmented Solow model, as introduced by Mankiw et al. 
(1992): the average gross secondary school enrolment rate, the average share of 
investment in GDP and the average population growth rate. As suggested by neoclassical 
growth theory, we expect the secondary school enrolment rate and the investment share to 
have a positive effect while the population growth rate should have a negative effect.
5 For the 
large set of control variables, we add the average inflation rate, the share of government 
consumption in GDP, a standard measure of trade openness – exports + imports relative to 
                                                 
2 We start by excluding countries with less than one million inhabitants. As we will demonstrate below, this 
choice is inconsequential for our main results. 
3 GDP data are from the World Bank’s Word Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). 
4 Details on the definition and the sources of all variables are given in the Data Appendix. 
5 Note that including both FDI and total investment (as a share of GDP) in the regression reduces the danger of 
overrating the effect of FDI .  11 
 
GDP – as well as the Fraser Institute’s index that reflects the quality of the legal structure 
and the security of  property rights. Finally, we include a dummy for oil-exporting 




5.1. Benchmark Results 
Table 1 reports the results of estimating equation (1) by pooled OLS. We start by implicitly 
imposing the restriction that J = G and estimate the influence of total FDI (as a share of GDP) 
on growth (column 1.1). While the control variables’ coefficients have the expected signs, 
they fail to be significantly different from zero. Total FDI, by contrast, has a significantly 
positive impact on growth. Moving to column (1.2), we see that this effect is predominantly 
driven by Greenfield FDI: while the coefficient of the M&A-regressor is negative, though 
insignificant, the coefficient of Greenfield FDI is significantly positive and somewhat higher 
than the coefficient of total FDI in column (1.1). The sharp difference between the two types 
of FDI also emerges once we include the large set of control variables in column (1.3). In 
addition, we see evidence of conditional convergence – i.e. a significantly negative effect of 
initial GDP – and lower standard errors for most other regressors once we use the larger set of 
control variables . This pattern – total FDI having a significantly positive effect which is 
largely driven by its “Greenfield” component – can also be seen when we divide investment 
flows by the host countries’ population instead of GDP (see columns (1.4) – (1.6)). 
 
*** Insert Table 1 around here *** 
 
The findings presented in Table 1 may be biased due to country-specific variables which are 
correlated with the regressors and which we could not account for explicitly (unobserved 
                                                 
6 To improve the readability of our tables, we do not display the coefficients of the regional dummies. Those 
results are available upon request. 12 
 
heterogeneity), or due to a reverse causal relationship between growth and FDI. To meet the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate equation (1) using the fixed effects 
estimator. Columns (2.1) and (2.2) give the results, indicating that our previous findings were 
not driven by omitted variable bias: while the coefficient of Greenfield FDI is somewhat 
lower relative to the pooled OLS result, it is still relatively close. In a next step, we tackled the 
(potential) endogeneity problem head-on: specifying a set of excluded instruments, which are 
correlated with FDI, but uncorrelated with the disturbance, we estimated equation (1) by two-
stage least squares (TSLS).
7 Column (2.3) presents the results from lumping M&As and 
Greenfield FDI together:  first, higher total FDI inflows (relative to GDP) have a positive 
effect on GDP growth, even if we account for the potential endogeneity of FDI. The F-
statistic of the first-stage regression and the p-value of Hansen’s J-statistic support the notion 
that our instruments are both relevant and exogenous. Column (2.4) presents the results of 
treating Greenfield FDI as a potentially endogenous variable. While it could be claimed that 
mergers and acquisitions are no less susceptible to the endogeneity problem, Eichengreen 
(2008:19) argues that “the literature on mergers and acquisitions (a form of FDI) suggests that 
such activity depends on the internal resources of firms in the acquiring countries.[...] Hence, 
there will be a component of FDI in emerging markets that is exogenous with respect to 
economic conditions there.” Estimating equation (1) by TSLS also a higher coefficient and 
thus reinforces our previous results: while M&A-type FDI has no effect on economic growth, 
the influence of Greenfield FDI is significantly positive.  
 
*** Insert Table 2 around here *** 
 
The last two columns of Table 3 show the results of applying the Blundell-Bond “Systems 
GMM” estimator to equation (1). The rationale for using this estimator is that equation (1) can 
be rewritten as 
                                                 
7 The instruments used are: the Polity-IV measure of political participation, the “investment profile” index from 
the International Country Risk Guide, a dummy for landlocked countries, the initial stock of FDI liabilities as a 














it t i it x FDI FDI y y
1
&
1 , ln 1 ln H [ M G J E D ,  (2) 
 
which reveals the presence of a lagged dependent variable. However, applying the fixed 
effects estimator to such an equation results in biased estimates, since the error term is 
mechanically correlated with one of the regressors. “Systems-GMM” estimator reacts to this 
problem by combining two equations: a first-differenced version of (2) is estimated using 
lagged levels of the regressors as instruments, and the original equation (2) is estimated using 
lagged differences as instruments. The results in column (2.5) indicate that ignoring this issue 
lead us to under-estimate the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.
8 However, this 
does not invalidate our key results that total FDI has a significantly positive influence on 
growth (column 2.5), and that this influence is predominantly driven by Greenfield FDI 
(column 2.6). Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for 
Greenfield
it FDI  is between the findings 
from the FE and the TSLS estimation and does not differ too much from the original OLS 
results. 
 
5.2. Robustness Checks: Varying Samples 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (1) using Pooled OLS for various 
subsamples: columns (3.1) and (3.2) are based on a dataset that excludes upper-middle 
income countries, while columns (3.3) and (3.4) exclude low-income countries. In both cases, 
the sample shrinks substantially, but this does not destroy our key result: There is a positive 
effect of FDI on economic growth in developing countries, but this effect is predominantly 
driven by the greenfield investments. By contrast, M&A sales have a negative (though 
insignificant) influence on growth. Including small countries that are characterized by a 
population of less than a million results in a somewhat larger sample and, again, confirms our 
                                                 
8 Column (2.1) suggests a coefficient of yi,t-1 of (1 - 0.319) = 0.681, which is substantially smaller than the 0.89 
reported in column (2.5). 14 
 
result. Note that the coefficient of greenfield FDI is surprisingly similar across these different 
subsamples. 
 
*** Insert Table 3 around here *** 
 
Table 4 splits the sample along the time dimension: columns (4.1) and (4.2) report the results 
of estimating equation (1) for the first half of the sample, while columns (4.3) to (4.4) refer to 
the second half. Interestingly, neither total FDI nor Greenfield FDI had significantly positive 
effect during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Conversely, considering the years after 1996 
re-establishes our previous result that the positive influence of Greenfield FDI drives a 
significantly positive effect of total FDI. Apart from supporting our distinction between 
different types of foreign direct investment, these results also suggest that the growth effects 
of FDI may have intensified in past years. The fact that we are using a more recent sample of 
data may thus explain why – in contrast to much of the existing literature – we find a 
significantly positive influence of FDI on economic growth. 
 
*** Insert Table 4  around here *** 
 
6. The Role of the Real Exchange Rate 
 
The results presented so far suggest that FDI has a significantly positive effect on FDI. 
However, this effect is exclusively driven by the “greenfield” variant of foreign direct 
investment, while the sale of existing firms to foreign multinationals in the context of 
“mergers and acquisitions” has no effect at best.  How can we reconcile this finding with the 
strong empirical evidence at the firm-level, which shows that changes of ownership and the 
entry of a multinational parent company regularly enhances the productivity of the 
subsidiary? Is there, indeed, a micro/macro puzzle, with foreign takeovers being beneficial at 
the firm level, but ineffective in the economy as a whole? 15 
 
In what follows, we will explore the role of the real exchange rate as one potential 
channel through which different types of FDI might have different growth effects. The idea 
that financial integration may do more harm than good by resulting in a real appreciation has 
been forcefully articulated by Rodrik and Subramanian (2008). They argue that most 
developing countries suffer from a shortage not of capital but of profitable investment 
o p p o r t u n i ti e s ,  a n d  t h a t t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  i n v e s t m e n t b a r r i e r s  m i g h t m a k e  m a t t e r s  w o r s e  b y 
reducing domestic firms’ price competitiveness. The detrimental effect of an overvalued (real) 
exchange rate on economic growth is further explored by Rodrik (2008) who shows 
empirically that it results in an inflated nontradables sector and lower growth. 
We will adopt Rodrik’s (2008) approach and use the Penn World Table’s “price level 
of Gross Domestic Product” as a real exchange rate. This variable gives “the PPP over GDP 
divided by the exchange rate times 100” (Heston et al., 2009), and an increase reflects a real 
appreciation. We use this variable directly as a regressand, but we also follow Rodrik (2008) 
in computing the real overvaluation at every point in time as the residual from a regression of 
the price level on GDP. The latter approach is motivated by the observation that there is a 
strong correlation between income levels and real exchange rates, which can be rationalized 
by referring to the models of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). Table 5 gives the results 
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variables. Including the lagged price level as a regressor allows for the possibility that, ceteris 
paribus, there is mean reversion in the real exchange rate. 
  The first two columns of Table 5 present the results of estimating equation (3) by 
OLS, using the oil dummy as well as regional dummies as control variables. The figures show 
that the initial price level has, indeed, a negative effect on the real appreciation in subsequent 
years, i.e. there is some mean reversion in the real exchange rate. More importantly, for our 16 
 
original question, the M&A component of FDI has a significantly positive effect on the 
growth rate of the real exchange rate and the extent of real overvaluation, while the 
coefficient of Greenfield FDI is positive, but not significant. To account for the possibility 
that this result simply  the results in columns (5.3) and (5.4), we added two variables that 
might have an effect on the real exchange rate while being correlated with the type of FDI 
i n f l o w s :  i f ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  M & A  t y p e  F D I  w e r e  a  s p e c i a l i t y  o f  r a t h e r  w e l l - d e v e l o p e d 
economies, the positive coefficient of this variable might simply pick up Balassa-Samuelson 
effects. Moreover, Greenfield FDI might be a reaction to protectionism which, in turn, could 
have an impact on the real exchange rate. With these considerations in mind, we included the 
degree of urbanization and the Fraser Institute’s index of the freedom to trade internationally. 
Not surprisingly, the urbanization variable has a significantly positive coefficient. By contrast, 
the positive effect of the trade-regime variable – with a higher value indicating less barriers to 
trade – is a bit odd. Most importantly, however, the result of the first two columns does not 
disappear: while M&A type investment results in a real appreciation, Greenfield FDI does not 
seem to have an effect on the real exchange rate. In column (5.5) and (5.6) we use the same 
set of variables, but apply the Blundell-Bond “Systems GMM” estimator that takes care of 
unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity. Now, the pure price variable is no longer 
affected by either type of FDI. However, if we focus on the change of the Rodrik (2008) 
overvaluation variable, our previous result prevails.  
These results show that the different types of FDI have differential effects on the real 
exchange rate and the extent of overvaluation. The detrimental effect of an overvalued real 
exchange rate on economic growth may, in turn, be the reason for our previous observation 
that Greenfield FDI enhances growth while M&A-type FDI doesn’t. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) comes in different forms: sometimes it increases the host 
country’s capital stock, sometimes it amounts to a pure change of ownership. The goal of this 
paper was to explore whether two conceptually different types of FDI – mergers and 17 
 
acquisitions (M&As) and Greenfield investment differ in their effect on economic growth. We 
have shown that they do: while Greenfield has a significantly positive influence on growth, 
M&A’s have no effect. This finding is robust across various estimation methods and 
subsamples. 
  We have also shown that M&As result in a real appreciation  while Greenfield FDI 
has no  such effect. We offer as a tentative conclusion that large M&A inflows – while 
possibly increasing productivity at the firm level – has adverse economic effects by reducing 
the price competitiveness of domestic firms. 
  Where do we go from here? Of course, one road for further research is to further the 
transmission channels through which different types of FDI influence (or do not influence) 
growth. Moreover, the large difference between M&As and Greenfield investment 
demonstrates that we should have a deeper understanding of the economic and institutional 
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Tables 
Table 1: Determinants of growth, Pooled OLS estimations 
  (1.1)  (1.2)  (1.3)  (1.4)  (1.5)  (1.6) 
             
FDI/GDP  1.594           
  (3.373)***           
M&A sales/GDP    -0.0442  -0.172       
    (-0.0455)  (-0.163)       
Greenfield FDI/GDP    1.864  1.772       
    (3.738)***  (3.299)***       
FDI/Pop.        0.000272     
        (2.660)***     
M&A sales/Pop.          -0.0447  -0.204 
          (-0.231)  (-1.126) 
Greenfield FDI/Pop.          0.434  0.350 
          (3.715)***  (2.869)*** 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.0197  -0.0164  -0.0606  -0.0331  -0.0374  -0.0778 
  (-0.837)  (-0.682)  (-2.368)**  (-1.265)  (-1.406)  (-3.087)*** 
Sec. school enrolment  0.0276  0.0390  0.120  0.00200  0.0410  0.115 
  (0.370)  (0.540)  (1.543)  (0.0243)  (0.515)  (1.491) 
Investment/GDP  0.121  0.104  0.219  0.237  0.194  0.313 
  (0.825)  (0.714)  (1.272)  (1.465)  (1.235)  (1.610) 
Population growth  -0.766  -0.849  -1.016  -0.690  -0.321  -1.011 
  (-0.508)  (-0.555)  (-0.677)  (-0.453)  (-0.219)  (-0.651) 
Log(inflation rate)      -0.0436      -0.0434 
      (-3.340)***      (-3.122)*** 
Government cons./GDP      -0.102      0.00967 
      (-0.967)      (0.0779) 
Trade openness      -0.0583      -0.0418 
      (-1.700)*      (-1.136) 
Fraser legal structure      0.0290      0.0305 
      (3.048)***      (2.863)*** 
Oil  0.0171  0.0135  0.00666  0.0184  0.0246  0.0130 
  (0.710)  (0.537)  (0.310)  (0.695)  (0.950)  (0.527) 
Constant  0.269  0.242  0.570  0.494  0.399  0.670 
  (1.536)  (1.376)  (3.050)***  (2.544)**  (2.041)**  (3.526)*** 
             
Observations  318  318  262  317  318  262 
R-squared  0.244  0.250  0.405  0.223  0.227  0.372 
Adjusted R-squared  0.209  0.213  0.358  0.187  0.188  0.323 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regional and period dummies 
included but not reported. 
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Table 2: Determinants of growth, alternative estimators 
  (2.1)  (2.2)  (2.3)  (2.4)  (2.5)  (2.6) 
  FE  FE  2SLS  2SLS  BB  BB 
             
FDI/GDP  1.409    4.456    3.175   
  (2.751)***    (3.170)***    (3.760)***   
M&A sales/GDP    1.024    0.792    2.328 
    (1.093)    (0.726)    (1.637) 
Greenfield FDI/GDP    1.484    3.646    2.521 
    (2.788)***    (2.584)***    (2.853)*** 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.319  -0.332  -0.0484  -0.0664  0.893  0.886 
  (-4.746)***  (-4.483)***  (-1.823)*  (-2.415)**  (14.73)***  (15.08)*** 
Sec. school enrolment  -0.248  -0.308  0.0686  0.111  0.241  0.253 
  (-1.585)  (-1.930)*  (0.837)  (1.297)  (1.377)  (1.423) 
Investment/GDP  0.548  0.547  0.177  0.238  0.339  0.438 
  (1.176)  (1.117)  (1.075)  (1.471)  (1.058)  (1.159) 
Population growth  0.762  0.895  -1.872  -2.262  -0.0114  0.367 
  (0.802)  (0.922)  (-0.815)  (-0.985)  (-0.00876)  (0.264) 
Log(inflation rate)  -0.0547  -0.0527  -0.0414  -0.0427  -0.0630  -0.0601 
  (-4.134)***  (-3.715)***  (-3.781)***  (-3.796)***  (-3.901)***  (-3.143)*** 
Government cons./GDP  -0.115  -0.108  -0.135  -0.111  -0.550  -0.395 
  (-0.313)  (-0.257)  (-0.970)  (-0.821)  (-1.920)*  (-1.394) 
Trade openness  0.136  0.159  -0.129  -0.0993  -0.133  -0.0948 
  (2.647)***  (3.256)***  (-2.774)***  (-2.452)**  (-1.996)**  (-1.355) 
Fraser legal structure  0.0235  0.0201  0.0155  0.0202  0.0361  0.0450 
  (2.262)**  (1.884)*  (1.522)  (1.981)**  (2.451)**  (2.636)** 
Oil      0.00784  0.00520  0.00553  0.0352 
      (0.291)  (0.194)  (0.132)  (0.876) 
Constant  2.614  2.769  0.542  0.661  0.885  0.841 
  (4.638)***  (4.371)***  (2.943)***  (3.670)***  (2.300)**  (2.326)** 
             
Observations  286  262  217  209  286  262 
Number of countries  91  83  63  61  91  83 
Adjusted R-squared  0.464  0.485  0.338  0.394     
F-test  14.26  18.99  9.402  9.215  421.4  383.8 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regional and period dummies 
included but not reported. 
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Table 3: Determinants of growth, alternative subsamples 
  (3.1)  (3.2)  (3.3)  (3.4)  (3.5)  (3.6) 




















             
FDI/GDP  1.538    1.890    1.764   
  (2.532)**    (5.053)***    (3.526)***   
M&A sales/GDP    -0.253    0.551    0.195 
    (-0.190)    (0.544)    (0.197) 
Greenfield FDI/GDP    1.625    2.239    1.913 
    (2.552)**    (4.749)***    (3.677)*** 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.0611  -0.0719  -0.0808  -0.0755  -0.0391  -0.0404 
  (-2.315)**  (-2.314)**  (-2.726)***  (-2.580)**  (-1.643)  (-1.568) 
Sec. school enrolment  0.0698  0.0962  -0.171  -0.163  0.0720  0.0864 
  (0.789)  (1.086)  (-1.588)  (-1.546)  (0.996)  (1.136) 
Investment/GDP  0.216  0.221  0.0314  0.0133  0.190  0.145 
  (1.147)  (1.081)  (0.208)  (0.0896)  (1.283)  (0.960) 
Population growth  -0.425  -0.367  -6.305  -6.184  -0.958  -0.879 
  (-0.312)  (-0.244)  (-3.816)***  (-3.870)***  (-0.713)  (-0.612) 
Log(inflation rate)  -0.0423  -0.0454  -0.0327  -0.0325  -0.0417  -0.0446 
  (-3.090)***  (-2.777)***  (-3.421)***  (-3.482)***  (-3.791)***  (-3.556)*** 
Government cons./GDP  -0.0964  -0.0995  -0.183  -0.180  -0.127  -0.119 
  (-0.831)  (-0.891)  (-1.326)  (-1.362)  (-1.186)  (-1.155) 
Trade openness  -0.0889  -0.0844  -0.0462  -0.0484  -0.0856  -0.0820 
  (-2.101)**  (-1.777)*  (-1.397)  (-1.540)  (-2.628)**  (-2.355)** 
Fraser legal structure  0.0264  0.0246  0.0192  0.0183  0.0277  0.0262 
  (2.499)**  (2.104)**  (2.064)**  (1.923)*  (3.144)***  (2.765)*** 
Oil  0.0411  0.0374  -0.0229  -0.0281  0.0115  0.00618 
  (1.634)  (1.373)  (-0.885)  (-1.088)  (0.562)  (0.301) 
Constant  0.553  0.685  1.086  1.043  0.441  0.425 
  (2.765)***  (2.895)***  (5.141)***  (4.959)***  (2.447)**  (2.299)** 
             
Observations  212  188  170  170  300  272 
Adjusted R-squared  0.384  0.382  0.462  0.465  0.353  0.350 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regional and period dummies 
included but not reported. 
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Table 4: Determinants of growth, alternative periods 
  (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6) 




             
FDI/GDP  1.311    1.236    1.343   
  (1.632)    (1.839)*    (2.498)**   
M&A sales/GDP    0.517    -1.274    -1.180 
    (0.157)    (-1.390)    (-1.187) 
Greenfield FDI/GDP    1.332    1.448    1.747 
    (1.431)    (1.982)*    (3.176)*** 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.0287  -0.0316  -0.0843  -0.101  -0.0417  -0.0431 
  (-1.015)  (-1.051)  (-2.132)**  (-2.390)**  (-1.899)*  (-2.024)** 
Sec. school enrolment  0.178  0.168  0.100  0.152  0.0474  0.0775 
  (1.781)*  (1.673)*  (1.037)  (1.565)  (0.707)  (1.189) 
Investment/GDP  0.211  0.219  0.335  0.369  0.276  0.253 
  (1.058)  (1.068)  (1.496)  (1.613)  (1.552)  (1.472) 
Population growth  -0.698  -0.601  -0.846  -1.105  -2.216  -2.187 
  (-0.488)  (-0.390)  (-0.419)  (-0.531)  (-1.083)  (-1.101) 
Log(inflation rate)  -0.0420  -0.0424  -0.0422  -0.0491  -0.00562  -0.00621 
  (-3.230)***  (-3.002)***  (-2.538)**  (-2.742)***  (-0.643)  (-0.705) 
Government cons./GDP  -0.102  -0.0924  -0.122  -0.129  -0.0970  -0.114 
  (-0.554)  (-0.506)  (-1.122)  (-1.126)  (-0.884)  (-1.082) 
Trade openness  -0.112  -0.120  -0.0607  -0.0372  0.00294  0.00405 
  (-1.806)*  (-1.855)*  (-1.966)*  (-1.145)  (0.0905)  (0.123) 
Fraser legal structure  0.0310  0.0338  0.0467  0.0418  0.00952  0.0107 
  (2.479)**  (2.672)***  (2.816)***  (2.319)**  (1.100)  (1.246) 
Oil  -0.0585  -0.0661  0.0820  0.0740  0.0122  0.00719 
  (-1.688)*  (-1.800)*  (1.915)*  (1.693)*  (0.604)  (0.349) 
Constant  0.323  0.348  0.651  0.782  0.426  0.424 
  (1.406)  (1.498)  (2.642)***  (3.105)***  (2.294)**  (2.382)** 
             
Observations  131  121  155  141  225  225 
Adjusted R-squared  0.353  0.341  0.414  0.425  0.339  0.357 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regional and period dummies 
included but not reported. 
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Table 5: Determinants of the real exchange rate 
  (5.1)  (5.2)  (5.3)  (5.4)  (5.5)  (5.6)  (5.7) 
  PWT  Rodrik  WDI  PWT  Rodrik  PWT  Rodrik 
               
M&A sales/GDP  5.678  4.156  3.080  3.141  3.185  3.675  4.889 
  (3.008)***  (2.342)**  (2.096)**  (1.855)*  (2.017)**  (1.377)  (1.746)* 
Greenfield FDI/GDP  0.956  0.811  0.938  0.782  0.429  0.534  0.425 
  (1.574)  (1.529)  (2.047)**  (1.417)  (0.847)  (0.829)  (0.574) 
Initial price level  -0.449      -0.474    0.360   
  (-7.906)***      (-6.138)***    (3.397)***   
Oil  0.0685  0.0317  -0.0871  0.0837  0.0406  0.123  0.0673 
  (1.318)  (0.677)  (-2.484)**  (1.708)*  (1.042)  (1.683)*  (1.040) 
Initial overvaluation    -0.445      -0.428    0.327 
    (-8.803)***      (-5.452)***    (3.305)*** 
Initial price level (WDI)      -0.558         
      (-9.027)***         
Urbanization        0.00261  0.000410  0.00525  0.00175 
        (1.920)*  (0.399)  (1.977)*  (0.798) 
Fraser trade        0.0497  0.0273  0.0260  -0.0109 
        (2.139)**  (1.174)  (0.697)  (-0.268) 
Constant  1.500  -0.142  -0.479  1.040  -0.351  1.731  -0.316 
  (7.533)***  (-2.167)**  (-10.38)***  (2.931)***  (-2.228)**  (3.335)***  (-1.128) 
               
Observations  338  338  336  291  291  291  291 
Adjusted R-squared  0.320  0.307  0.442  0.327  0.281     
Number of wbcode_id            83  83 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regional and period dummies 
included but not reported. 
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Developing Countries and Emerging Markets: Average M&A Sales per country (millions of 
USD)




































































































































































































































































































































































SEN: M&A Sales SEN: Greenfield FDI